No.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AMERICULTURE, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
LOS LOBOS RENEWABLE POWER, LLC, et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
SCOTT E. GANT
Counsel of Record
AARON E. NATHAN
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
1401 New York Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 237-2727
sgant@bsfllp.com
Counsel for Petitioners

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Like twenty-nine other states and the District of
Columbia, New Mexico has enacted a statute
specifically designed to deter SLAPP (“strategic
lawsuits against public participation”) lawsuits, which
unduly discourage speech and engagement about
matters of public concern.
New Mexico’s “anti-SLAPP” statute requires
expedited disposition of dismissal motions and an
award of attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing
defendant. In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit
held that those provisions are inoperative in federal
court—deepening an entrenched circuit split on the
applicability of state anti-SLAPP provisions in federal
court.
The questions presented are:
1. Whether a state anti-SLAPP provision requiring
an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing
defendant applies in federal court—as the First,
Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have concluded, in
conflict with the D.C. Circuit and the Tenth Circuit
below.
2. Whether a state anti-SLAPP provision requiring
expedited disposition of dismissal motions applies in
federal court, as the First and Fifth Circuits have
concluded, in conflict with the D.C. Circuit and the
Tenth Circuit below.

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioners are AmeriCulture, Inc., a New Mexico
corporation, and Damon Seawright, an individual,
defendants-appellants in the court below.
Respondents are Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC,
and Lightning Dock Geothermal, HI-01, LLC, both
Delaware corporations, plaintiffs-appellees in the court
below.

iii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 29.6 of this Court, Petitioner
AmeriCulture, Inc. states that it has no parent
corporation, and no publicly held company owns 10%
or more of its stock. Petitioner Damon Seawright is an
individual.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit (App. 1a-33a) is reported at 885
F.3d 659. The opinion of the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico denying
Petitioners’ motion to dismiss is available at 2016 WL
8254920 and reproduced at App. 40a-51a. The opinion
of the District Court certifying its order for
interlocutory appeal is available at 2016 WL 8261743
and reproduced at App. 34a-39a.
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals entered judgment on March
12, 2018. On April 4, 2018, Justice Sotomayor
extended the time to file a petition for certiorari to and
including July 16, 2018 (No. 17A1064). This Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The statutory provisions and rules relevant to this
petition, including the Rules of Decision Act, the Rules
Enabling Act, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, New
Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute, and the anti-SLAPP
statutes implicated in the other cases relevant to the
circuit splits discussed in this petition are reproduced
in the Appendix at 52a-78a.
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INTRODUCTION
“[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than
self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
To protect their citizens’ rights to participate freely
in self-government, thirty states and the District of
Columbia have enacted “anti-strategic lawsuits against
public participation” (or “anti-SLAPP”) statutes to
deter lawsuits that chill speech and engagement about
matters of public concern.
The decision below
deepened a circuit split over whether such state antiSLAPP laws apply in federal courts exercising
jurisdiction over state law claims.1
New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute features two
mechanisms to protect against SLAPP suits: (1) it
requires “expedited” consideration of a defendant’s
motion to dispose of the case, and (2) it requires an
award of attorneys’ fees to a defendant who invokes the
statute as a defense and obtains dismissal. In the
decision below, the Tenth Circuit held—in conflict with
other circuits (and in accord with the D.C. Circuit)—
that those state anti-SLAPP protections are
inoperative in federal court.

While the plaintiffs in this case invoked the District Court’s
diversity jurisdiction, infra at n. 3, the questions presented here
can arise whenever federal courts exercise jurisdiction over state
law claims, such as pursuant to the supplemental jurisdiction
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151
(1988).
1

3
The Tenth Circuit’s holding was incorrect. As
several other circuits have recognized when
confronting similar state anti-SLAPP provisions, those
provisions do not conflict with any federal rule, and are
part of the substantive “law of the state” that must
apply in federal court unless federal law says
otherwise.
The decision below also interferes with statecreated rights. New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute was
designed and enacted “to protect citizens who exercise
their right to petition from the financial burden of
having to defend against retaliatory lawsuits.”
Cordova v. Cline, 396 P.3d 159, 166 (N.M. 2017). That
objective was frustrated by the Tenth Circuit’s refusal
to apply the State’s anti-SLAPP law in federal court.
And, ironically, the decision below encourages
precisely the kind of forum-shopping the Erie doctrine
seeks to avoid—in at least two respects. The refusal to
give effect in federal court to state anti-SLAPP laws
will encourage the filing of SLAPP suits in federal
court. But the disagreement among courts of appeals
about the questions presented also means that a given
state’s anti-SLAPP law may be enforced in some
federal courts but not others—encouraging plaintiffs to
cherry-pick among federal courts to avoid application
of the statutes.
The Court should grant the petition to resolve the
circuit split regarding the important questions
presented.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Legal Background
1. The Erie/Hanna Doctrine
This case concerns an important, contemporary
application of the familiar and longstanding rule that
“roughly, . . . federal courts are to apply state
‘substantive’ law and federal ‘procedural’ law” when
adjudicating state law claims. Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 471 (1965); see also Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-79 (1938).
This Court has explained that a federal rule
governs the matters to which it applies, so long as the
rule is consistent with the Constitution, and with the
Rules Enabling Act, which requires that the federal
rules “shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Where there
is no federal rule on point, the Rules of Decision Act
requires that federal courts apply the “law of the state”
within the meaning of that Act, as interpreted in Erie
and its progeny. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652; Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-52 (1980).
While familiar, this framework has occasionally
presented this Court with challenging questions. See
Walker, 446 U.S. at 744 (“The question whether state
or federal law should apply on various issues arising in
an action based on state law which has been brought in
federal court under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
has troubled this Court for many years.”).
In Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945), this Court set out what later became known as
the “outcome-determination” test for whether the Rules
of Decision Act and Erie make a state-law rule
applicable in federal court. The Court explained that
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Erie’s intent “was to insure that, in all cases where a
federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of
the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome
of the litigation in the federal court should be
substantially the same . . . as it would be if tried in a
State court. The nub of the policy that underlies Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction
the accident of suit by a non-resident litigant in a
federal court instead of in a State court a block away,
should not lead to a substantially different result.” Id.
at 109. The Guaranty Trust Court accordingly
concluded that a New York statute of limitations
barring recovery in a suit if brought in state court
“bears on a State-created right vitally and not merely
formally or negligibly,” and that because the
consequences of the rule “so intimately affect recovery
or non-recovery,” it should apply in federal court. Id.
at 110.
In Hanna, 380 U.S. 460, the Court announced
another “pathmarking” decision, in which it explained
that Erie “command[s] the enforcement of state law”
only where there is “no Federal Rule which cover[s] the
point in dispute.” Id. Where a federal rule conflicts
with a state rule on the same point, Hanna held the
federal rule controls so long as it falls within
Congress’s “power to regulate matters which, though
falling within the uncertain area between substance
and procedure, are rationally capable of classification
as either.” Id. at 472.
As for the “outcomedetermination” test, the Hanna court explained it
should be read in light of “the twin aims of the Erie
rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance
of inequitable administration of the laws.” Id. at 468.
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In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518
U.S. 415 (1996), the Court addressed the application of
the Erie/Hanna doctrines to a New York statute that
permitted the state’s appellate courts “to order new
trials when the jury’s award ‘deviates materially from
what would be reasonable compensation.’” Id. at 418
(quoting N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & Rules (CPLR)
§ 5501(c)). Recognizing that the provision at issue
contained “both ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’” aspects,
the Court explained that the “dispositive question” was
“whether federal courts can give effect to the
substantive thrust of § 5501(c) without untoward
alteration of the federal scheme for the trial and
decision of civil cases.” Id. at 426. The Court
determined they could, holding: New York’s
substantive “deviates materially” standard applies in
federal court, but primary responsibility for its
application would be “lodge[d] in the district court, not
the court of appeals,” in light of the Seventh
Amendment’s constraint on appellate review of juryfound facts. Id. at 437-38.
More recently, this Court considered whether
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 precluded the
application in federal court of a New York statute
barring “a suit to recover a ‘penalty’ from proceeding as
a class action.” Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A.
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 397 (2010).
Five Justices concurred in a judgment reversing the
court below, concluding that Rule 23 preempted the
New York law, but without agreeing on a single
rationale.
In the only section of any opinion to command a
majority of the Court, Justice Scalia explained that
because in that case the federal and state rules were in
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conflict—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 provided
that a class action like Shady Grove’s “may be
maintained,” while the New York statute provided that
a class action seeking penalty damages “may not be
maintained”—the state rule could not apply in federal
court unless the federal rule was invalid. Id. at 399.
The Court fractured on the next steps in the
analysis, however. Justice Scalia wrote that upon
finding a conflict between a federal and state rule—
where the rules “attempt[] to answer the same
question,” 559 U.S. at 399—the only remaining inquiry
is whether the federal rule is valid. Id. at 407-09. If
so, it controls. Id.
Justice Scalia explained that a federal rule
promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act is valid so
long as it governs “only the manner and the means by
which the litigants’ rights are enforced,” and does not
“alter[] the rules of decision by which the court will
adjudicate those rights.” Id. at 407. According to
Justice Scalia, a federal rule’s validity does not depend
on whether it affects a litigant’s state-created
substantive rights. Id. at 407, 408-410. A federal
procedural rule is either valid or invalid in all
jurisdictions and all cases. Id. at 409-10.
Justice Stevens, the fifth vote to reverse, agreed
there was a conflict between Rule 23 and the New York
law, but disagreed with the next steps in Justice
Scalia’s analysis. In Justice Stevens’s view, where
federal and state rules appear to conflict, the Rules
Enabling Act’s command that the Federal Rules “shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right”
means “federal rules cannot displace a State’s
definition of its own rights or remedies.” Id. at 418.
Therefore, “federal rules must be interpreted with

8
some degree of sensitivity to important state interests
and regulatory policies, and applied to diversity cases
against the background of Congress’ command that
such rules not alter substantive rights and with
consideration of the degree to which the Rule makes
the character and result of the federal litigation stray
from the course it would follow in state courts.” Id. at
418-19.
Although Justice Stevens conceded this can be
“tricky” to implement,” he explained “the balance . . .
turns, in part, on the nature of the state law that is
being displaced by a federal rule.” Id. at 419. The
“nature of the state law,” meanwhile, “does not
necessarily turn on whether the state law at issue
takes the form of what is traditionally described as
substantive or procedural. Rather, it turns on whether
the state law actually is part of a State's framework of
substantive rights or remedies.” Id.
Justice Stevens laid out a two-step framework that,
in his view, this Court’s precedents require courts to
implement: “The court must first determine whether
the scope of the federal rule is sufficiently broad to
control the issue before the court, thereby leaving no
room for the operation of seemingly conflicting state
law,” including after the federal rule has been “fairly
construed, with sensitivity to important state interests
and regulatory policies.” Id. at 421.
Then—if the federal rule is “sufficiently broad to
control the issue before the Court, such that there is a
‘direct collision’” between the federal and state rule—
the court must decide whether the rule is a valid
exercise of the Court’s power to prescribe rules under
the Rules Enabling Act. Id. at 422. Here again, a
reviewing court has an obligation to construe the
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federal rule narrowly, where possible, to avoid an
interpretation that would “abridge, enlarge, or modify
a substantive right,” including one cloaked in the guise
of a state procedural rule. Id. at 422-23. If such a
“saving construction” is impossible, “federal courts
cannot apply the rule.” Id. at 423.
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg and three other
Justices concluded that there was “no unavoidable
conflict” between Rule 23 and New York’s law, id. at
452, and that “[w]hen no federal law or rule is
dispositive of an issue, and a state statute is outcome
affective . . . the Rules of Decision Act commands
application of the State’s law in diversity suits,” id. at
456. The four dissenting Justices therefore would have
held that New York’s law applies in federal court. Id.
at 458.
2. Anti-SLAPP Statutes
Three decades ago, Professors George Pring and
Penelope Canan warned of a “new and very disturbing
trend”: “Americans by the thousands [were] being sued,
simply for . . . ‘speaking out’ on political issues.”
George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, “Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation” (“SLAPPs”): An
Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12
Bridgeport L. Rev. 937, 938 (1992); see also Penelope
Canan & George W. Pring, Research Note, Studying
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation:
Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 L.
& Soc’y Rev. 385, 386 (1988). To describe such
lawsuits, Professors Pring and Canan coined the term
“Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,” or
“SLAPP.”
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The “disturbing trend” identified by Professors
Pring and Canan thirty years ago persists—and,
according to some, has intensified. See Jeremy Rosen
& Felix Shafir, Helping Americans to Speak Freely, 18
Federalist Soc’y Rev. 62, 70 (2017) (“Each year, more
and more people across the country are sued for
speaking out”); Timothy D. Biché, Note, Thawing
Public Participation: Modeling the Chilling Effect of
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation and
Minimizing Its Impact, 22 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 421,
422-23 (2013) (“Over the past forty years, there has
been a surge in the number of lawsuits brought in
retaliation for a citizen’s exercise of his or her right to
petition.”); Katelyn E. Saner, Note, Getting SLAPP-ed
in Federal Court: Applying State Anti-SLAPP Special
Motions to Dismiss in Federal Court After Shady
Grove, 63 Duke L.J. 781, 789 (2013) (“[T]he advent of
the Internet as a new means for speaking out publicly
has greatly increased the number of SLAPP suits.”).
Seeking to deter SLAPP suits, thirty states and the
District of Columbia have enacted anti-SLAPP
statutes, “to give more breathing space for free speech
about contentious public issues.” Abbas v. Foreign
Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2015);
see also Robert Post, Reply: Understanding the First
Amendment, 87 Wash. L. Rev. 549, 550 (2012) (most
states have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes “tak[ing]
account of the transaction costs” and chilling effects “of
litigating First Amendment rights”); Colin Quinlan,
Note, Erie and the First Amendment: State AntiSLAPP Laws in Federal Court After Shady Grove, 114
Colum. L. Rev. 367, 370 (2014) (SLAPP suits “inhibit[]
the exercise of First Amendment rights, because even
targets who persevere and eventually prevail on the
merits must spend substantial time and money to do
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so, and the experience deters them from speaking out
in the future.”).
Common anti-SLAPP provisions include expedited
consideration of motions to dismiss, modification of the
standard of proof on such a motion, a stay discovery
while an anti-SLAPP motion is pending, and award of
attorney’s fees for a prevailing defendant.
3. New Mexico’s Anti-SLAPP Statute
New Mexico enacted its anti-SLAPP statute in
2001. The original bill was the product of bipartisan
sponsorship in New Mexico’s House of Representatives,
and—hardly coincidentally, but appropriately given
the facts of this case—emerged in the wake of two
high-profile lawsuits designed to “intimidat[e] citizen
opposition in public forums to land development
projects,” which two scholars have described as “classic
SLAPP suits.” Frederick M. Rowe & Leo M. Romero,
Resolving Land-Use Disputes by Intimidation: SLAPP
Suits in New Mexico, 32 N.M. L. Rev. 217, 219 (2002);
see also id. at 226-27 (describing passage of the law).
New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute declares that “it
is the public policy of New Mexico to protect the rights
of its citizens to participate in quasi-judicial
proceedings before local and state governmental
tribunals.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.2. Finding that
lawsuits frustrating these rights “have been filed,” the
statue provides they “should be subject to prompt
dismissal or judgment to prevent the abuse of the legal
process and avoid the burden imposed by such baseless
lawsuits.” Id.; see also Cordova, 396 P.3d at 166
(“[T]he purpose of the statute is to protect citizens who
exercise their right to petition from the financial
burden of having to defend against retaliatory
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lawsuits.”). Accordingly, the statute’s Subsection A—its
expedited disposition provision—states:
Any action seeking money damages against a
person for conduct or speech undertaken or
made in connection with a public hearing or
public meeting in a quasi-judicial proceeding . . .
is subject to a special motion to dismiss . . . that
shall be considered by the court on a priority or
expedited basis to ensure the early consideration
of the issues raised by the motion and to prevent
the unnecessary expense of litigation.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(A).
Subsection B, the fee-shifting provision, provides
that the statute may be raised “as an affirmative
defense,” and that where a defendant raises “the rights
afforded” by the statute and prevails on a motion to
dismiss, “the court shall award reasonable attorney
fees and costs incurred by the moving party in
defending the action.” Id. § 38-2-9.1(B).2
B. Facts and Proceedings Below
Petitioner Damon Seawright is co-founder and
President
of
Petitioner
AmeriCulture,
Inc.
(“AmeriCulture”), an aquaculture company specializing
in the farming of Nile tilapia.
Since 1995,
AmeriCulture has operated a tilapia farm on its 15acre property in southwestern New Mexico, rearing
Although the provision is not implicated here, New Mexico’s
anti-SLAPP statute also provides for an expedited appeal from a
trial court’s order disposing of an anti-SLAPP motion, or from a
trial court’s “failure to rule on the motion on an expedited basis.”
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(C).
2
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tilapia on pure, naturally heated well water drawn
from the geothermal aquifer beneath the land.
Respondent Los Lobos Renewable Power Company,
LLC (“Los Lobos”) is the sole member of Respondent
Lightning Dock Geothermal HI-01, LLC (“LDG”). C.A.
App. 116 (Am. Compl. ¶ 1). LDG is the current lessee
of a geothermal resources lease from the Bureau of
Land Management. Id. at 118 (Am. Compl. ¶ 9). LDG
uses the underground resources for geothermal power
generation. Id.
Some of the geothermal resources included in LDG’s
federal lease underlie AmeriCulture’s land. When
AmeriCulture began operations in 1995, it entered into
a Joint Facilities Operating Agreement (“JFOA”) with
LDG’s predecessor on the federal lease, reconciling
each party’s rights in the geothermal resources under
AmeriCulture’s land. C.A. App. 138-145. In that
agreement, LDG’s predecessor granted AmeriCulture
the right to “drill and develop” any geothermal
resources under AmeriCulture’s land up to a depth of
1,000 feet, so long as AmeriCulture’s activity is
intended for uses other than electric generation, like
supplying heated water to AmeriCulture’s fish-farming
facilities. C.A. App. 140. LDG is now the successor to
the federal lease and assignee of its predecessor’s
rights and obligations under the JFOA. C.A. App. 11819.
The dispute giving rise to this case centers on
Petitioners’ participation in public proceedings related
to activities that Respondents planned to carry out on
land not covered by the JFOA. App. 3a-4a; C.A. App.
171. In 2011, AmeriCulture was among the dozens of
parties who filed protests with the New Mexico State
Engineer relating to Respondents’ application for a
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permit relating to wells that would produce water for
use at their power plant. C.A. App. 41, 20104. Respondents also separately applied to the New
Mexico Oil Conservation Division for permits relating
to three shallow injection wells, all of which were off
the property covered by the JFOA. C.A. App. 4757. AmeriCulture also filed a protest to that
application. C.A. App. 58.
Six days after Petitioners filed their protest with
the Oil Conservation Division, Respondents
commenced a lawsuit in federal district court against
them, asserting claims based on their petitioning
activities, App. 3a-4a; C.A. App. 127-28 (Am. Compl.
¶ 44), and seeking declaratory, injunctive and
monetary relief. C.A. App. 129-136.3 Expressly
invoking their rights under New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP
statute, Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint,
seeking both expedited dismissal and an award of
attorneys’ fees. App. 4a, 43a; C.A. App. 29-40.
Without reaching the substance of Petitioners’ antiSLAPP motion, the District Court denied it, holding
that “New Mexico’s Anti-SLAPP statute is a procedural
provision that does not apply in the courts of the
United States.” App. 35a, 43a. However, the District
Court “observe[d] disagreement among the courts of
appeals” about whether state anti-SLAPP provisions
apply in federal court. App. 46a; see id. at 46a-47a

Respondents invoked the District Court’s jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1332, alleging complete diversity among the parties, and
that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 excluding interest
and costs. App. 42a-43a.
3
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(reviewing holdings of the First and Ninth Circuits in
conflict with that of the D.C. Circuit).
Petitioners sought leave to file an interlocutory
appeal to the Tenth Circuit. App. 35a. The District
Court granted that motion, holding that its order
denying the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss was
immediately appealable under the collateral order
doctrine, App. 35a-37a, and separately certifying its
order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), App. 38a-39a. As the District Court
explained, it reached that latter conclusion because
“the applicability of state Anti-SLAPP statutes in
diversity cases is an important question of law about
which the circuits are divided.” App. 39a.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed.4 After noting that
“Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Shady Grove provides
the controlling analysis in the Tenth Circuit” on
questions of state-law application in federal diversity
suits, App. 17a n.3, the panel explained its view that
an “overriding consideration” in such cases is whether
the state provision at issue would be outcomedeterminative. App. 16a-17a. According to the panel,
“[t]his means that in a federal diversity action, the
district court applies state substantive law—those
rights and remedies that bear upon the outcome of the
suit—and federal procedural law—the processes or
modes for enforcing those substantive rights and
remedies.” App. 17a.
The panel held that it had appellate jurisdiction under the
collateral order doctrine, after concluding Petitioners had not
timely applied to the Tenth Circuit for permission to file an
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). App. 8a-16a.
4
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The panel observed that “distinguishing between
procedural and substantive law is not always a simple
task,” and that “[w]here the line between procedure
and substance is unclear, the Supreme Court has set
forth a multi-faceted analysis designed to prevent both
forum shopping and the inequitable administration of
the laws.” App. 17a-18a.
The panel, however, disclaimed the need for any
such analysis in the case of New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP
statute, calling it “hardly a challenging endeavor” to
determine whether the statute’s provisions should
apply in federal court, “assuming one is able to
read.” App. 18a.
The panel concluded that New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP
statute “is nothing more than a procedural mechanism
designed to expedite the disposal of frivolous
lawsuits” (App. 18a; see also App. 27a), and therefore
may not be applied in federal court. The panel also
determined the statute’s fee-shifting provision may not
be applied in federal court, calling the provision
“entirely meaningless absent” the expedited motion-todismiss provision,5 and merely a “sanction” “designed
not to compensate for legal services but to vindicate
First Amendment rights threatened by a kind of
unwarranted or specious litigation.” App. 23a.

The panel did not acknowledge or discuss the statute’s
severability provision, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(F). See App.
19a.
5
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I. There Is a Circuit Split on the Applicability of
State Anti-SLAPP Fee-Shifting Provisions in
Federal Court
Nearly every jurisdiction which has enacted an
anti-SLAPP statute has provided for an award of
attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant.6 Both before
and after Erie, this Court has made clear that a state
statute awarding attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party
“reflects a substantial policy of the state,” which
“should be followed” in diversity litigation unless it
“run[s] counter to a valid federal statute or rule of
court” which “usually it will not.” Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31
(1975) (quoting 6 Moore, Federal Prac. 54.77(2), at
1712-13 (2d ed. 1974)); see People of Sioux Cnty. v.
Nat’l Surety Co., 276 U.S. 238, 243 (1928); see also
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52 (1991) (“fee-

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-752(D); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-63506(b)(1); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c)(1); Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 52-196a(f); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8138(a)(1); D.C. Code § 165504(a); Fla. Stat. § 768.295(4); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-11.1(b.1);
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634F-2(8)(B); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 110/25; Ind.
Code § 34-7-7-7; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5329(g); La. Code Civ. Proc.
Ann. art. 971(b); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 556; Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 231 § 59(H); Minn. Stat. § 554.04(1); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 537.528; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,243(1); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 41.670(1)(a); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(B); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law
§ 70-a(1)(a); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1438(A)(1); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 31.152(3); 27 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7707; R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(d);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-1003(c); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§ 27.009(a)(1); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1405(1)(a); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 12, § 1041(f)(1); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-223.2(B).
6
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shifting rules . . . embody a [state] substantive policy”
when a statute “permits a prevailing party in certain
classes of litigation to recover fees”).
Consistent with that understanding, several
circuits have applied the fee-shifting provisions of antiSLAPP statutes. Two circuits, however, including the
Tenth Circuit in the decision below, have concluded
otherwise.
A. Several Circuits Have Held That AntiSLAPP Fee-Shifting Provisions Apply in
Federal Court
In United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed
Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999), the
Ninth Circuit determined that certain provisions of the
California anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. P. Code
§ 425.16, must apply in federal court. Id. at 973.
Among those was Cal. Civ. P. Code § 425.16(c), which
provides that a defendant who prevails with an antiSLAPP motion “shall be entitled to his or her
attorney’s fees and costs.”
Cal. Civ. P. Code
§ 425.16(c). Newsham, 190 F.3d at 972-73. The Ninth
Circuit observed that the fee-shifting provision of
California’s anti-SLAPP statute did not conflict with
any federal rule. Id. Next, the court determined that
California’s anti-SLAPP law furthered substantive
interests, and that applying the law in federal court
advanced the “twin purposes” of Erie—discouraging
forum-shopping
and
avoiding
inequitable
administration of the law. Id. at 973. Unpreempted by
a valid federal law, California’s anti-SLAPP feeshifting provision therefore applied in federal court.
Id.
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Since Newsham, the Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly
held that the [California] anti-SLAPP provisions
governing attorneys’ fees apply to state-law claims in
federal court.” Law Offices of Bruce Altschuld v.
Wilson, 632 Fed. App’x 321, 322 (9th Cir. 2015)
(affirming an anti-SLAPP fee award and citing cases);
see also Khai v. Cnty. of L.A., --- Fed. App’x ---, 2018
WL 1476646, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 2018) (affirming
award of attorneys’ fees, which “are mandatory for a
successful anti-SLAPP motion”).7 And the Ninth
Circuit has extended its holding in Newsham to apply
to Oregon’s anti-SLAPP statute, including its feeshifting provision. See Northon v. Rule, 637 F.3d 937,

The Ninth Circuit subsequently reaffirmed Newsham while
declining to reconsider its holding en banc. See Makaeff v. Trump
Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied,
736 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2013). Concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc, Judges Wardlaw and Callahan (joined by
Judges Fletcher and Gould) reaffirmed the reasoning of Newsham,
explaining it was unaltered by Shady Grove. 736 F.3d at 1181
(Wardlaw, J., and Callahan, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc). Judge Watford dissented from the court’s
denial of rehearing en banc, joined by then-Chief Judge Kozinski
and Judges Paez and Bea. In their view, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12 and 56 together “establish the exclusive criteria for
testing the legal and factual sufficiency of a claim in federal
court.” Id. at 1188 (Watford, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc). But the dissent made no specific argument
that California’s anti-SLAPP fee-shifting provision should not
apply in federal court. Id. at 1188-92.
7
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938-39 (9th Cir. 2011); Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d
981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009).8
Like the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit has
determined that state anti-SLAPP fee-shifting
provisions apply in federal court.
In Godin v.
Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010), the court held
that Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 556, which includes a provision for attorneys’ fees to
prevailing defendants, “must be applied” in federal
court. Id. at 81. The Godin court concluded that
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56 were not
sufficiently broad “as to cover the issues within the
scope of” Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, and that the
dual purposes of Erie—discouragement of forumshopping and avoidance of inequitable administration
of the laws—“are best served” by enforcement of the
anti-SLAPP statute in federal court. Id. at 87-88. The
court also observed that declining to apply Maine’s
statute would “result in an inequitable administration
of justice between a defense asserted in state court and
the same defense asserted in federal court,” specifically
noting that doing so would allow a plaintiff filing in
federal court to “circumvent any liability for a
defendant’s attorney’s fees or costs.” Id. at 92.
Although it concluded that the Maine anti-SLAPP
statute was “so intertwined with a state right or
The Ninth Circuit had also applied Washington’s anti-SLAPP
statute. See Phoenix Trading, Inc. v. Loops LLC, 732 F.3d 936,
941-42 (9th Cir. 2013). However, in 2015, the Washington
Supreme Court struck down the entire law because one of its
provisions violated the state’s constitutional guarantee of a trial
by jury, and the provision was not severable. Davis v. Cox, 351
P.3d 862, 864 (Wash. 2015).
8
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remedy that it functions to define the scope of the
state-created right,” and that no properly interpreted
federal rule supplanted the Maine fee-shifting
provision, id. at 89, the First Circuit noted that “if
Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 were thought to preempt
application of all of Section 556, a serious question
might be raised under the Rules Enabling Act,” id. at
90.9
The Second Circuit too has found anti-SLAPP feeshifting provisions applicable in federal court. In
Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d 138
(2d Cir. 2013), the Second Circuit confronted
California’s anti-SLAPP statute and, like the Ninth
Circuit, held that it applies in federal court. The court
of appeals explained that “federal courts apply those
state rules of decision that are ‘substantive’ under Erie,
and are consistent with federal law.” Id. at 152.
Because the anti-SLAPP statute was “a substantive
policy favoring the special protection of certain
defendants from the burdens of litigation because they
engaged in constitutionally protected activity,” id. at
148, the court held that the district court erred in
concluding the anti-SLAPP rule did not apply, id. at
156. Then, in Adelson v. Harris, 774 F.3d 803 (2d Cir.
2014), the Second Circuit held that Nevada’s antiSLAPP fee-shifting provision, Nev. Rev. Stat § 41.670,
applies in federal court, calling its application

The First Circuit has extended Godin’s holding concerning
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute to Massachusetts’s anti-SLAPP
statute—which also includes a fee-shifting provision. Steinmetz v.
Coyle & Caron, Inc., 862 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2017) (applying Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 59H).
9
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“unproblematic.”
Id. at 809
Synergistics, 718 F.3d at 153)).

(citing

Liberty

And, citing the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Newsham,
the Fifth Circuit has applied Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP
statute, La. Code Civ. P. art. 971, in federal court.
Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, LLC, 566 F.3d 164,
168-69, 182-83 (5th Cir. 2009) (ordering dismissal of
plaintiff’s complaint based on the statute’s burdenshifting framework, and remanding the case “for a
determination of [defendant’s] entitlement to fees and
costs” under the anti-SLAPP law’s fee-shifting
provision).10
B. Two Circuits Have Held That Anti-SLAPP
Fee-Shifting Provisions Are Inapplicable in
Federal Court
Parting ways with several of their sister circuits,
the Tenth Circuit in the decision below joined the D.C.
Circuit in concluding that a state anti-SLAPP feeSeveral times since Henry the Fifth Circuit has applied a state
anti-SLAPP statute in deciding the case before it. See, e.g., Cuba
v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 711 (5th Cir. 2016) (“The TCPA [Texas
Citizen Participation Act] applies to these claims”). In Cuba, the
court observed: “The Henry court reasoned that even though the
Louisiana anti-SLAPP statute was built around a procedural
device—a special motion to dismiss—it nonetheless applied in
federal court under the Erie doctrine because it was functionally
substantive.” Id. at 706 n.6. Noting a circuit split, Judge Graves
dissented in Cuba, arguing the TPCA should not apply in federal
court, citing the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Abbas. Id. at 719-20 &
n.1 (“Our sister circuits that have considered this issue have
split”). Some Fifth Circuit panels applying state anti-SLAPP laws
have assumed they apply without expressly deciding the question.
See, e.g., Block v. Tanenhaus, 867 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 2017).
10
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shifting provision may not be applied in federal court.
See App. 16a-28a; see also supra at 16.
In Abbas, the D.C. Circuit held that the D.C. antiSLAPP statute may not be applied in federal court.
Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333-37. Believing that the statute
and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56
“answer the same question,” id. at 1337, the Abbas
court proceeded to consider whether those federal rules
are valid. Noting that Shady Grove’s fractured
opinions failed to produce binding precedent regarding
the “test for whether a Federal Rule violates the Rules
Enabling Act,” id. at 1336-37, the Abbas court adopted
the approach described in Justice Scalia’s plurality
opinion, which “strictly followed” Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941), under which “any federal
rule that ‘really regulates procedure’ is valid under the
Rules Enabling Act.” Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1337.
Concluding that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12
and 56 “really regulate[] procedure,” the Abbas court
determined they are “valid under the Rules Enabling
Act” and preempt state rules that attempt to answer
the “same question” differently. Id. at 1337 (citing
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14). The court accordingly found
that the district court had erred in granting an antiSLAPP motion to dismiss. Id. at 1337. And, even
though the D.C. Circuit affirmed dismissal of the
complaint on other grounds, the court refused to award
fees or costs to the prevailing defendant, which were
authorized by the D.C. anti-SLAPP law. Abbas, 783
F.3d at 1335 n.5. Instead, the court held that the feeshifting provision could only apply in federal court if
the other anti-SLAPP provision did as well. Abbas,
783 F.3d at 1335 n.3.
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II. There Is a Circuit Split on the Applicability of
State Anti-SLAPP Expedited Motions in
Federal Court
Twenty-four of the thirty-one anti-SLAPP
jurisdictions have included provisions calling for some
form of expedited consideration of anti-SLAPP
motions.11 Two circuits, covering seven of the states
that have enacted such provisions, have determined
these expedited motion to dismiss provisions
harmonize (or can be harmonized) with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and should apply in federal
court. Two circuits—including the Tenth Circuit, in
the decision below—covering five of the jurisdictions
that have enacted such provisions, have determined
they are inapplicable in federal court.
As detailed above (supra at 20-21), in Godin, 629
F.3d at 89-90, the First Circuit held that Maine’s antiSLAPP statute, Me. Rev. Stat. § 556, which calls for
expedited consideration of an anti-SLAPP motion,
applies in federal court. The Fifth Circuit reached the
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-752(A); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-63507(a)(2); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(f); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52196a(e); D.C. Code § 16-5502(d); Fla. Stat. § 768.295(4); Ga. Code
Ann. § 9-11-11.1(d); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634F-2(1); 735 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 110/20(a); Ind. Code § 34-7-7-9(a)(2); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 605320(d), (f); La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 971(C)(3); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 14, § 556; Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-807(d)(1);
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 59(H); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.528(1);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,245; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(3)(f); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(A); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, §§ 1433(A)-(C); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 31.152(1); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§§ 27.004(a), 27.007(b); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1404(1)(b); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1041(d).
11
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same conclusion with regard to Louisiana’s antiSLAPP law, and its expedited motion-to-dismiss
provision, in Henry, 566 F.3d at 168-69.
The Tenth Circuit in the decision below, and the
D.C. Circuit, disagreed—as explained above (supra at
16, 23-24). See App. 19a-20a (“All subsection A
demands is expedited procedures designed to promptly
identify and dispose of [frivolous] lawsuits.”); Abbas,
783 F.3d at 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that the
District of Columbia’s expedited anti-SLAPP motion
does not apply in federal court).
III.

The Decision Below Was Incorrect
A. Anti-SLAPP
Fee-Shifting
Provisions
Should Apply in Federal Court

The Tenth Circuit’s refusal to apply New Mexico’s
anti-SLAPP fee-shifting provision was incorrect—and
can find little support in this Court’s precedents.
No federal rule or law even arguably conflicts with
New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP fee-shifting provision12—and

Although the Tenth Circuit did not cite Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54, it creates a default rule that prevailing federal
litigants are entitled to costs, but does not itself create an
entitlement to fees. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(ii) (motion for
fees must “specify . . . statute, rule, or other grounds entitling
the movant to the award”); see also Medical Protective Co. v.
Pang, 740 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Rule 54 provides a
federal procedural mechanism for moving for attorney’s fees that
are due under state law.”).
12
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the Tenth Circuit cited none.13 See Shady Grove
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S.
393, 410 (2010) (Scalia, J.) (“the framework we apply
. . . requires first, determining whether the federal and
state rules can be reconciled”).
Because no federal rule answers the question
whether Petitioners may recover attorneys’ fees if they
prevail, New Mexico’s fee-shifting provision must
govern because it is part of the State’s substantive law.
Like other States’ analogous provisions, New
Mexico’s Subsection B “creates a new liability where
none existed before.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949). It does not regulate
“merely the manner and the means by which a right to
recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced”—it is a
The decision below made no attempt to argue that a federal
rule conflicts with the fee-shifting provision, and no federal rule
does. But even if there were an arguable conflict, the fee shifting
provision is “so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it
functions to define the scope of the state created right” and so
“cannot be displaced by” the federal rules. Godin, 629 F.3d at 89
(quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
“Further, if [the federal rules] were thought to preempt
application of” that provision, “a serious question might be raised
under the Rules Enabling Act,” id., as it is highly doubtful
whether the Act permits this Court to preempt a state’s
mandatory fee-shifting provision. Faced with a (hypothetical)
colorable argument that some federal rule did conflict with a
state’s fee-shifting provision, the proper course would be for this
Court to adopt a “saving construction” of the federal rule to
comport with the Rules Enabling Act’s command that the federal
rule “shall not abridge . . . or modify any substantive right”—
including substantive rights based on state law. Shady Grove,
559 U.S. at 422-23 (Stevens, J., concurring).
13
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“right to recover.” Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109.
See also Chambers, 501 U.S. at 52 (“fee-shifting
rules . . . embody a [state] substantive policy” when a
statute “permits a prevailing party in certain classes of
litigation to recover fees”); 17A Moore’s Federal
Practice–Civil § 124.07[3][b] (2008) (“State law
generally governs a litigant’s entitlement to an award
of attorney’s fees because attorney fee statutes are
substantive state law.”) (citing Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 259
n.31); 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 2669 (3d ed. 2014) (“[C]ases holding state
law controlling . . . appear analytically sounder. . . .
[and] particularly appropriate . . . when state law
provides for the recovery of an attorney's fee as a part
of the claim being asserted.”).
As such, “the accident of suit by a non-resident
litigant in federal court instead of in a State court a
block away” cannot be allowed to determine New
Mexico’s prerogative to create and enforce that right to
recover. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109. The First
Circuit correctly recognized this in Godin, when it
observed that declining to apply Maine’s anti-SLAPP
statute would “result in an inequitable administration
of justice between a defense asserted in state court and
the same defense asserted in federal court,” specifically
noting that doing so would allow a plaintiff filing in
federal court to “circumvent any liability for a
defendant’s attorney’s fees or costs.” 629 F.3d at 92.
Applying New Mexico’s fee-shifting provision in federal
court would advance Erie’s “twin aims”—
“discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of
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inequitable administration of the laws.” Hanna, 380
U.S. at 468.14
The decision below “represent[s] a serious
encroachment on state-created rights in the absence of
a clear countervailing federal policy.” 10 Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2669 (3d ed.
2014); cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 443 (2010) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (This Court’s “decisions instruct over
and over again that, in the adjudication of diversity
cases, state interests . . . warrant our respectful
consideration.”). The purpose of New Mexico’s antiSLAPP statute “is to protect citizens who exercise their
right to petition from the financial burden of having to
defend against retaliatory lawsuits.” Cordova, 396
P.3d at 165. That objective was frustrated by the
Tenth Circuit’s refusal to apply the statute’s feeshifting provision in federal court.15
The Tenth Circuit concluded that New Mexico intended
Subsection B as a “sanctions” provision, which the court therefore
viewed as “procedural.” App. 22a. The better reading is that
Subsection B is exactly what it says it is: a state-law provision
awarding attorneys’ fees to all prevailing defendants whose speech
or public participation has become the target of litigation. But in
any event, a proper analysis under Erie “looks not to
the labels but to the content of state rules of decision.” Liberty
Synergistics, 718 F.3d at 152.
14

The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that attorneys’ fees
and costs made available under the State’s anti-SLAPP statute
are available even when dismissal is based on federal law. See
Cordova, 396 P.3d at 162 (affirming dismissal based on the First
Amendment, but reversing lower court’s determination that antiSLAPP statute did not apply, and holding that “Petitioners are
statutorily entitled to an award of attorney fees”).
15
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B. Anti-SLAPP Provisions for Expedited
Consideration of Motions Should Apply in
Federal Court
Subsection A of New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute
provides that a SLAPP suit “is subject to a special
motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the
pleadings, or motion for summary judgment that shall
be considered by the court on a priority or expedited
basis to ensure the early consideration of the issues
raised by the motion and to prevent the unnecessary
expense of litigation.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(A).
The Tenth Circuit held that Subsection A is
“procedural” as a matter of New Mexico law and
therefore inapplicable in federal court. But, as with its
assessment of the statute’s fee-shifting provision, the
court’s analysis and conclusion are both incorrect.
No federal statute or rule conflicts with the New
Mexico anti-SLAPP statute’s expedited motion to
dismiss provision.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56, which
govern aspects of motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment in federal court, are silent about the timing
of a court’s consideration of such motions. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12, 56. Unlike in Shady Grove, they do not answer
the “same question.” 559 U.S. at 399.
The panel’s contrary holding ignored this, focusing
entirely on the supposed “procedural” character of New
Mexico’s expedited motion to dismiss provision. But
“[r]ules which lawyers call procedural do not always
exhaust their effect by regulating procedure.” Cohen,
337 U.S. at 555. New Mexico’s expedited-motion-todismiss provision is “so intertwined with a state right
or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the
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state created right,” and is appropriately viewed as
“substantive” for purposes of an Erie analysis. Shady
Grove, 559 U.S. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring).
The Tenth Circuit’s refusal to give effect to the right
to expedited disposition conferred by New Mexico’s
anti-SLAPP statute also runs counter to wellestablished federal law that a federal court “cannot
give a [state-created claim] longer life in the federal
court than it would have had in the state court without
adding something to the cause of action.” Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530,
533-34 (1949).
In a closer case than this one, a federal rule of
procedure arguably in conflict with a state law
provision would have to be read with “sensitivity to
important state interests,” Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at
421 (Stevens, J., concurring)—to both faithfully
interpret the Rules Enabling Act, and avoid if possible
a reading that would render the federal rule invalid,
id. at 422-24. Those considerations, combined with the
longstanding presumption that federal law does not
“cavalierly” preempt state law, Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555, 565 n.3 (2009), and the special force of that
presumption in the Rules Enabling Act area, reinforce
the conclusion that there is no conflict here.
In any event, reconciling Subsection A with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12, so that both can apply, does
not present a serious problem. They “can exist side by
side, . . . each controlling its own intended sphere of
coverage without conflict.” Walker, 446 U.S. at 752. A
federal court can plainly “give effect to the substantive
thrust” of Subsection A “without untoward alteration of
the federal scheme” governing dispositive motions.
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426.
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IV.

This Case Is an Excellent Vehicle for
Resolving the Circuit Split Regarding the
Important Questions Presented

The proliferation of anti-SLAPP statutes is one of
the most significant statutory developments affecting
speech and public debate in recent decades. And as
anti-SLAPP statutes have multiplied, so have cases
about them. See Travelers Casualty Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Hirsh, 831 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2016) (Kozinski,
J., concurring) (reporting that anti-SLAPP “cases have
more than tripled over the last ten years”).
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But the well-recognized divide among the courts of
appeals about their application in federal court16 is
promoting forum-shopping and undercutting the
efficacy of anti-SLAPP laws.
Given the prevalence of anti-SLAPP laws and their
impact on the exercise of First Amendment rights, the

See, e.g., 19 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 4509 (3d ed. 2016) (discussing “divergent case law currently
surrounding statutes meant to curb the use of . . . SLAPP
lawsuits,” and observing that “[r]esolution of some of the
questions raised by anti-SLAPP statutes may require resolution
by the Supreme Court”); William James Seidleck, Comment, AntiSLAPP Statutes and the Federal Rules: Why Preemption Analysis
Show They Should Apply in Federal Diversity Suits, 166 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 547, 548 (2018) (“The anti-SLAPP circuit split now offers the
Supreme Court a unique opportunity to correct the broader
confusion over the relationship between the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and state laws.”); David C. Thornton, Comment,
Evaluating Anti-SLAPP Protection in the Federal Arena: An
Incomplete Paradigm of Conflict, 27 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J.
119, 121 (2016) (“circuit courts are divided in their determination
of whether state anti-SLAPP laws apply in federal courts”); see
also Travelers Casualty, 831 F.3d at 1183 (Kozinski, J.,
concurring) (Observing after Abbas was decided by the D.C.
Circuit: “Now we’ve got a circuit split, and we’re standing on the
wrong side.”); Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 718 n.1 (5th Cir.
2016) (Graves, J., dissenting) (“Our sister circuits that have
considered this issue have split, with some deciding that federal
courts may apply Anti-SLAPP statutes.”); Mitchell v. Hood, 614
Fed. App’x. 137, 139 n.1 (5th Cir. 2015) (“there is disagreement
among courts of appeals as to whether state anti-SLAPP laws are
applicable in federal court at all”); Intercon Solutions, Inc. v. Basel
Action Network, 791 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting
“disagreement among appellate judges”); Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1335
(acknowledging contrary decisions by the First, Fifth and Ninth
Circuits).
16
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disparate treatment of states by their home federal
circuits concerning application of their anti-SLAPP
statutes is sufficient to warrant this Court’s
intervention. But the problem is even more acute. A
California speaker can rely on the Ninth Circuit to
afford her the protection of her home state’s antiSLAPP law. But what if that California speaker is
sued in federal court in the Tenth Circuit or the
District of Columbia? Even if local choice-of-law rules
mandate the application of California law, local circuit
precedent holding anti-SLAPP provisions inapplicable
in federal court would deny her all the California law
to which she is entitled. Cf. Adelson, 774 F.3d at 809
(Second Circuit analyzing, independently and de novo,
the applicability of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute in
federal court, despite the Ninth Circuit’s earlier
resolution of the issue).
This case presents the Court with an opportunity to
consider the applicability in federal court of two
specific, but widely implemented, anti-SLAPP
provisions—without having to decide the applicability
in federal court of every feature of state anti-SLAPP
laws.17 Providing much-needed guidance to the lower
Some circuits have taken a piecemeal approach in evaluating
the applicability of particular anti-SLAPP provisions in federal
court. The Second Circuit has held that two provisions of
Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute are applicable in federal court, but
explained that a third, which bars discovery upon filing of an antiSLAPP motion, “may present a closer question.” Adelson, 774
F.3d at 809. The Ninth Circuit has held that the California antiSLAPP statute’s fee-shifting and “special motion to strike”
provisions must apply in federal court, Verizon Delaware, Inc. v.
Covad Commc’ns Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004), but has
separately held that the statute’s discovery-limiting provisions
17
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courts will enable those courts to address disputes
about other anti-SLAPP provisions informed by, and
with the benefit of, this Court’s views about the
questions presented in this petition.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
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and limitations on amendment must not, id.; Metabolife Int’l, Inc.
v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 845 (9th Cir. 2001). The Eleventh
Circuit has recognized the circuit splits discussed here, but held
that a different provision—the Georgia anti-SLAPP statute’s theneffective requirement that a complaint be accompanied by an
attorney’s “written verification under oath,” Ga. Code Ann. § 9-1111.1(b) (West 2015)—could not apply in federal court because it
was preempted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Royalty
Network, Inc. v. Harris, 756 F.3d 1351, 1357-62 (11th Cir. 2014);
but see id. at 1362-63 (Jordan, J., concurring).

